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1. Introduction 
In recent years, network analysis has become a standard methodology for exploring and describ-
ing group relations and social exchange (Borgatti et al. 2013; Scott 1998). As exemplified by Fig. 
1, it is based on nodes and arcs, representing actors and their mutual relations. In spite of its 
merits and great scientific success, social network analysis has some serious drawbacks if it is 
used for analysing social exchange and the related norms of behaviour. First, it mainly refers to 
just one type of relations: power, love, or influence, to give a few examples. The reality of social 
exchange is obviously more complicated: trade relations between two companies imply e.g. not 
only a flow of a commodities from A to B but also a financial counterflow from B to A. Second, the 
different relations between the connected nodes are not independent, as often suggested in clas-
sical network analysis: if in the previous example the financial flow from B to A is interrupted, the 
supply of commodities from A to B is also stopped. Third, classical network analysis is rather 
static and lacks the conceptual tools to represent processes, i.e. sequences of events. For exam-
ple, in the case of delivery on credit, the commodity flow from A to B starts first and the financial 
counterflow from B to A is delayed. Conversely, in the case of advance payment, the sequence of 
flows is just the reverse. 
 
 
Fig. 1: An elementary dyad in traditional network analysis 
In order to tackle the deficiencies of the traditional social network analysis, the author proposes 
to use the Petri net approach. It was invented by Carl Adam Petri in the 1960s for studying paral-
lel processes in computer systems. However, its basic concepts like tokens, places, and transi-
tions are general enough to be also used for modelling administrative and industrial processes 
(Van der Aalst, Stahl 2011; Heitsch et al. 2001). Nonetheless, applications in sociological research 
are still rare: among other scholars (e.g. Köhler, Rölke 2001) the author used it in an earlier pub-
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lication (Mueller 2014) for studying the enactment of anti-smoking laws. In the present paper he 
first presents the main concepts of sociological Petri net analysis and subsequently uses them for 
studying a classic topic of social exchange theory: the norms of the Melanesian Kula trade, as 
described by Bronislaw Malinowski (2010: chap. 3). 
2. Petri nets: A short overview 
2.1 The descriptive tools of Petri nets 
There are many different versions of Petri net analyses. Nonetheless, they have three basic ele-
ments in common (Reisig 1985: chap. 1; Desel, Reisig 1998): 
a) Tokens, which may be anything that can be moved from one place, person, or organisation to 
another: cheques, commercial goods, legislative proposals, etc. In Petri net diagrams like Fig. 
2 they are generally represented as black dots. 
b) Places, which can host tokens. They are indicated by big circles (see Fig. 2) and define the lo-
cation of tokens. The bearing capacity of places is generally limited: small empty circles indi-
cate available places. 
c) Transitions, indicated by rectangular bars (see Fig. 2). At regular time intervals they transfer 
(“fire”) a token from an original to a connected target place – provided there is free space at 
the target and a token at the origin. 
 
 
Fig. 2: An exemplary Petri net with places, tokens, and transitions 
Depending on the phenomena to be modelled, the three basic elements of the Petri net approach 
can be supplemented and modified. Tokens may e.g. assume a time-dependent value v, like in 
Fig. 3, which allows the researcher to construct timed Petri nets (Wang 1998). v may be e.g. the 
changing commercial value of a good, which is only sold and exchanged with others, if it has 
reached a certain value e (see Fig. 3). This way, the transition from A to B becomes a conditional 
event, which is accordingly specified in the Petri net diagram. Often v is the clock time, which 
triggers or inhibits other processes. 













if v ≥ ε
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Tokens which are not time-dependent may too influence parallel processes by triggering and 
inhibiting the related transitions. Fig. 4 presents two equivalent mechanisms with the related 
symbols: if there is a token at place D, the transition A -> B is inhibited. If there is no token at D, 
the transition from A to B is possible, provided there are tokens at A and spaces at B. An inverse 
logic applies to place C: if it holds no token, the transition A -> B is inhibited. If there is a token 
at C, the transition from A to B is enabled, provided there are tokens at A and spaces at B. Thus, 
before the transition D -> C, the transition A -> B is locked by two redundant mechanisms. After 
the transition D -> C, the transition A -> B is enabled by the same two mechanisms. They are 
obviously useful for modelling social exchange, where there are generally two flows of items 
which are reverse and interdependent: in Fig. 4, the transfer A -> B is only possible after the re-
alisation of the transition D -> C. This obviously also reflects an asymmetry of power between the 
actors controlling the different flows: the actor in control of the transition A -> B expects his/her 




Fig. 4: A Petri net with enabling and inhibition of transitions 
2.2 The usage of Petri nets for the analysis of social exchange 
If applied to social exchange, Petri net models may allow to tackle to following scientific ques-
tions and goals: 
a) Precise descriptions of existing institutions of social exchange and their functional design. 
b) Stress tests for revealing the conditions under which institutions of social exchange fail to 
function in the way they have been designed. The number of norm violations or institutional 
breakdowns are typical indicators, which may vary by the workload or the number of partici-
pating actors. 
c) Comparisons of institutions with regard to their performance under different conditions. The 
performance may e.g. be measured by the number of transactions per unit of time, which an 
institution is able to perform. 
Place A
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d)  Design of new institutions of exchange. This kind of social engineering includes precise de-
scriptions, stress tests, optimisation of performance, and comparisons with similar existing 
institutions. 
Obviously, the previous analyses are more theoretical than empirical, since they are focussed on 
institutions and conditions which are often only virtual and do not (yet) exist in the real world. 
Thus the author suggests to use computer simulation in order to explore and compare Petri net 
models. It is flexible with regard to the changes in the analysed scenarios and easy to use for 
sociologists, who are generally less trained in mathematics. More demanding alternatives are 
calculations with matrix algebra or graphical analyses of sequential net states (Wang 1998: chap. 
2.5). 
3. A Petri net analysis of the Kula ring 
3.1 Introductory remarks 
Nearly one hundred years ago, the ethnographer Bronislaw Malinowski (2010 [1922]) published 
his famous book Argonauts of the Western Pacific. In chapter 3 of this work, he describes the 
Kula trade in Melanesia, which has inspired many other social scientists like Blau (1967, p. 93), 
Mauss (1990, p. 53 ff.), Leach and Leach (1983), and more recently Ziegler (1990, 2007, 2008). 
Kula is a symbolic exchange of prestigious goods, where decorated necklaces circulate clockwise 
and beautiful arm shells in the opposite direction between islands east of Papua New Guinea. Kula 
accompanies conventional trade with agricultural goods and manufactured products and serves 
for creating social cohesion and trust (Ziegler 2008: 209). Typically for Kula, there is always a 
temporal delay between the receipt of a gift and the presentation of an equivalent return gift. The 
first transaction intentionally creates a debt, which later has to be compensated by a reverse 
transaction (Gregory 1983, p. 115). Thus, Malinowski observed a system of delayed reciprocity, 
which is different from immediate reciprocity, where gifts and return gifts are exchanged at the 
same occasion.  
In the following sections the author first attempts to represent the delayed reciprocity of the 
Kula trade as a Petri net in order to compare it with the alternative of immediate reciprocity, 
which too is modelled as a Petri net. Subsequently he performs stress tests for both models in 
order to explore their performance if Kula goods are running short. Such shortages may occur if 
merchants are extending their network (Ziegler 2008: 109) or illicitly hoarding Kula goods (Zieg-
ler 2008: 109), or if new trade partners with no Kula goods enter into the system. The focus of 
these stress tests is first on the maintenance of reciprocity designed for improving social cohe-
sion, second on the integration of newcomers, and third on possible breakdowns of the whole 
exchange system. The respective theoretical investigations are performed with computer simula-
tions: an Excel program runs the Kula trade with the respective norms of reciprocity over a period 
of 200 units of time and analyses the results for different initial distributions of Kula goods. 
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Fig. 5a: Delayed reciprocity as the original Kula model 
 
 
Fig. 5b: Immediate reciprocity as an alternative model  
Actor A Actor B Actor C
Good 1: Necklaces
A -> B B -> C C -> A
Actor A Actor C Actor B 
Good 2: Arm shells
B -> A C -> B A -> C
Direction of Trade
Actor A Actor B Actor C
Actor A Actor C Actor B 
Good 1: Necklaces
Good 2: Arm shells
A -> B B -> CC -> A
B -> A C -> B A -> C
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3.2 Two models of the Kula trade 
Figure 5a presents the original Kula trade – for reasons of simplification with only three trade 
partners A, B, and C. Each of the three actors is able to present a necklace (good 1) to his or her 
neighbour. As conceptualised by the principle of delayed reciprocity, the return gifts in terms of 
arm shells are blocked by a time dependent token called “Direction of Trade”. One time step later, 
this token is in the alternate position, where it inhibits the trade with good 1 and releases the 
exchange of good 2 (arm shells). Each of the actors A, B, and C is now able to fulfil his/her obli-
gation of reciprocity, which however may be impossible in the case of a shortage of good 2. Thus 
the delayed reciprocity does not prevent violations of the norms of exchange. 
Figure 5b shows the counterfactual alternative of a Kula trade with immediate reciprocity: 
whenever two actors meet, they must exchange gifts before doing barter with commercial goods. 
If by a shortage of arm shells or necklaces one of the traders cannot offer a gift, the other will 
abstain from doing so: if actor A has e.g. no necklaces, the transfer of arm shells from B to A is 
not enabled, even if actor B is in possession of the respective good. Similarly, if actor B has no 
arm shells to give to A, the transfer of necklaces from A to B is disabled, independently of the 
stocks of actor A. Thus, according to Fig. 5b, there is either a two-way exchange of gifts or no 
exchange at all. In the first case the obligation of immediate reciprocity is fulfilled, whereas in the 
second the norm is considered as being violated. 
3.3 Comparisons of the two models of reciprocity 
Exchanging gifts is a symbolic act of mutual liking and consequently fosters social cohesion, 
which is further enhanced by respecting the related social norms of giving and receiving presents. 
Thus, in this section we are using the mean number of exchange cycles between the actors A, B, 
and C (see Figs. 5a, b), which are conforming to the specific norms of reciprocity. An exchange 
cycle fulfilling the norm of immediate reciprocity comprises just one encounter, where a gift and 
an immediate return gift are simultaneously exchanged. An exchange cycle fulfilling the norm of 
delayed reciprocity requires two successive encounters, where first a gift and one unit of time 
later a return gift are exchanged by the trading partners. 
As long as there are 3 tokens of good 1 and 3 tokens of good 2 in the respective Petri nets of 
Figs. 5a and 5b, the maximum of both types of reciprocities is reached. If there are less tokens 
available, the reciprocities diminish and become dependent on the initial distribution of tokens 
between the three actors and the length of the computer simulations. For this reason the cohe-
sion scores of Figs. 6a and 6b are equal to the mean number of reciprocities, equally averaged 
over all possible initial distributions of tokens and 200 simulated units of time.  
A comparison between Figs. 6a and 6b reveals no difference between immediate and delayed 
reciprocity if one of the two goods is completely lacking: not very surprisingly social cohesion is 
for both types of reciprocity equal to zero. A similar observation holds for full endowment with 
goods: if 3 items of good 1 and 3 items of good 2 are available, both types of reciprocity norms 
lead to the maximum cohesion score 3. The farer away the endowment with goods from this op-
timal point, the lower the cohesion resulting from both types of reciprocities. However, the com-
parison between Figs. 6a and 6b shows that the cohesion from delayed reciprocity is always equal 
to or better than the corresponding cohesion from immediate reciprocity. 
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Legend: Red: higher than reference (= Fig. 6b); white: identical with reference (= Fig. 6b). 
Operationalisation: Social cohesion = Mean number of exchange cycles between actors A, B, 
and C which correspond to the norm of delayed reciprocity. Minimum = 0, maximum = 3. 
Fig. 6a: Social cohesion for delayed reciprocity 
 
 
Legend: Blue: lower than reference (= Fig. 6a); white: identical with reference (= Fig. 6a). 
Operationalisation: Social cohesion = Mean number of exchange cycles between actors A, B, 
and C which correspond to the norm of immediate reciprocity. Minimum = 0, maximum = 3. 
Fig. 6b: Social cohesion for immediate reciprocity 
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Reference: Percentage of breakdowns for immediate reciprocity: see Fig. 7b. Legend: Blue: low-
er than reference; white: identical with reference. 
Fig. 7a: Delayed reciprocity: Percentage of initial distributions leading to breakdown 
 
 
Reference: Percentage of breakdowns for delayed reciprocity: see Fig. 7a. Legend: Red: higher 
than reference; white: identical with reference. 
Fig. 7b: Immediate reciprocity: Percentage of initial distributions leading to break-
down 
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A part of the low cohesion scores is due to the breakdown of the institution of reciprocal ex-
change of Kula gifts, which means that giving and receiving goods of type 1 and type 2 stops 
shortly after the start of the simulation. Its occurrence depends again on the initial distribution of 
the available goods among the actors A, B, and C. Consequently, we are analysing in Figs. 7a and 
7b the percentage of initial distributions which result in this kind of deadlock. It obviously varies 
between 0% and 100%. As Fig. 7a shows, breakdowns hardly ever occur for delayed reciprocity. 
The only trivial exception is the total absence of any Kula good. As soon as there exists at least 
one token of one of the goods, it is transferred from one actor to the next, even if there is no 
reciprocity due to a total lack of the other good. Consequently, the complete breakdown of the 
exchange system can be avoided. This situation is completely different from immediate reciproci-
ty: if one type of good is totally missing, the available other good can also not be traded because 
of the lack of an immediate return gift. As Fig. 7b shows, this situation results in 100% of cases in 
a breakdown. Partial deadlocks with frequencies lower than 100% still happen for milder forms of 
shortages of goods. Although the institution of immediate reciprocity can also be fail-safe – e.g. 
if one type of good is fully endowed with 3 tokens and the other with at least 1 token – it is clear-
ly less robust than delayed reciprocity. For all those cases where according to Fig. 7b breakdowns 
reach the level of 100%, the long-term survival of the institution of immediate reciprocity is likely 
to be endangered. 
The previously discussed breakdown of exchange is just one of the risks which threatens the 
long-term survival of an institution like Kula. Another risk is the failure to recruit and integrate 
new members in order to replace others who abandoned the Kula trade for reasons of bad health 
or old age. It is accentuated by the fact that newcomers may at the beginning lack the resources 
for really participating in the system. In order to assess this risk for immediate and delayed reci-
procity, we simulated the mean long-term participation in good 1 and good 2 for actors having 
different initial endowments with the mentioned Kula goods. The results are presented in Tab. 1. 
Table 1: Mean long-term participation in goods 1 and 2 of a newcomer, by his/her initial 
participation and the type of reciprocity 
 Immediate reciprocity: Delayed reciprocity: 
Initial participation: Long-term participation: Long-term participation: 
Good 1: Good 2: Good 1: Good 2: Good 1: Good 2: 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.66 
0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.66 1.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.66 
Legend: Long-term participation: Mean possession of goods over 200 simulated units of time. Bold: 
Higher than the corresponding figure of the other type of reciprocity. 
Note: Initial participation of the two non-newcomers: Good 1 = 1, Good 2 = 1. 
Under the rule of immediate reciprocity, a newcomer lacking both goods has no chance at all to 
get into the Kula trade: having nothing to offer to his/her trade partners, the person cannot get 
any goods from them. This exclusion is obviously different from the situation of a poor novice 
under the rule of delayed reciprocity. Here, the same person gets tokens from his/her neigh-
bours, who hope to receive later return gifts, although this may not always be the case. In the 
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long run, however, originally poor newcomers are in possession of 0.66 tokens of both goods 
(see Tab. 1), which can be exchanged with others and thus guarantee their partial integration into 
the Kula trade. Under the rule of immediate reciprocity, partial integration is only possible if a 
newcomer has one token either of good 1 or of good 2. Nonetheless, the resulting long-term 
participation equals only 0.50 for each of the goods, which is according to Tab. 1 clearly inferior 
to the situation of newcomers to the Kula system with delayed reciprocity. In sum, immediate 
reciprocity has a lower capacity to integrate newcomers, except for the trivial situation, where 
they are fully endowed with Kula resources (see Tab. 1, 1st line). 
4. Summary and conclusions 
This article started with a critique of traditional network analysis. For describing and analysing 
social exchange it is too static, mainly focused on one type of relations, and often neglecting the 
interdependence of different network ties. As an alternative, the author suggests using the tools 
of Petri nets. In order to show their applicability for such purposes, he presents an analysis of the 
Melanesian Kula trade, which was originally described by Malinowski. Petri nets are indeed useful 
for describing the rules of delayed reciprocity, which is a central feature of Kula. They can also be 
used for a precise description of an alternative fictitious Kula rule, i.e. immediate reciprocity. The 
author subsequently performs stress tests for both types of reciprocity, assuming that some of 
the trade partners are lacking resources, which are essential for participating in the Kula. Com-
puter simulations reveal that delayed reciprocity has strategic advantages as compared to the 
alternative of immediate reciprocity. It guarantees more social cohesion, has a lower risk of 
breakdowns, and allows to integrate newcomers with no Kula resources. The latter two properties 
are crucial for any institution and may explain the observed long-term survival of the Kula trade: 
in spite of global modernisation, it still existed in the 1970s, i.e. sixty years after the ethno-
graphic observations of Malinowski (Leach 1983). 
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